Overwhelming Evidence for Less Government Spending

Alberto Alesina of Harvard's economics department summarizes some of his research in a column for today's Wall Street Journal. He and a colleague looked at fiscal policy changes in developed nations and found very strong evidence that spending reductions boost growth. This, of course, contrasts with the lack of evidence for the Keynesian notion that growth is stimulated by a bigger burden of government spending.

Politicians argue for increased stimulus spending, as opposed to spending cuts, on the grounds that it would speed up economic recovery. This argument might have it exactly backward. Indeed, history shows that cutting spending in order to reduce deficits may be the key to promoting economic recovery. ...recent stimulus packages have proven that the "multiplier"—the effect on GDP per one dollar of increased government spending—is small. Stimulus spending also means that tax increases are coming in the future; such increases will further threaten economic growth. Economic history shows that even large adjustments in fiscal policy, if based on well-targeted spending cuts, have often led to expansions, not recessions. Fiscal adjustments based on higher taxes, on the other hand, have generally been recessionary. My colleague Silvia Ardagna and I recently co-authored a paper examining this pattern, as have many studies over the past 20 years. Our paper looks at the 107 large fiscal adjustments—defined as a cyclically adjusted deficit reduction of at least 1.5% in one year—that took place in 21 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries between 1970 and 2007. ...Our results were striking: Over nearly 40 years, expansionary adjustments were based mostly on spending cuts, while recessionary adjustments were based mostly on tax increases. ...In the same paper we also examined years of large fiscal expansions, defined as increases in the cyclically adjusted deficit by at least 1.5% of GDP. Over 91 such cases, we found that tax cuts were much more expansionary than spending increases. How can spending cuts be expansionary? First, they signal that tax increases will not occur in the future, or that if they do they will be smaller. A credible plan to reduce government outlays significantly changes expectations of future tax liabilities. This, in turn, shifts people's behavior. Consumers and especially investors are more willing to spend if they expect that spending and taxes will remain limited over a sustained period of time. On the other hand, fiscal adjustments based on tax increases reduce consumers' disposable income and reduce incentives for productivity. ...Europe seems to have learned the lessons of the past decades: In fact, all the countries currently adjusting their fiscal policy are focusing on spending cuts, not tax hikes. Yet fiscal policy in the U.S. will sooner or later imply higher taxes if spending is not soon reduced. The evidence from the last 40 years suggests that spending increases meant to stimulate the economy and tax increases meant to reduce deficits are unlikely to achieve their goals. The opposite combination might.

Alesina's research echoes the findings in dozens of other studies, a few of which are cited in this Center for Freedom and Prosperity video I narrated.

Don't Be Afraid of the Chinese Economic Tiger

The news that China has surpassed Japan as the world's second-largest economy has generated a lot of attention. It shouldn't. There are roughly 10 times as many people in China as there are in Japan, so the fact that total gross domestic product in China is now bigger than total gross domestic product in Japan is hardly a sign of Chinese economic supremacy. Yes, China has been growing in recent decades, but it's almost impossible not to grow when you start at the bottom - which is where China was in the late 1970s thanks to decades of communist oppression and mismanagement. And the growth they have experienced certainly has not been enough to overtake other nations based on measures that compare living standards. According to the World Bank, per capita GDP (adjusted for purchasing power parity) was $6,710 for China in 2009, compared to $33,280 for Japan (and $46,730 for the U.S.). If I got to choose where to be a middle-class person, China certainly wouldn't be my first pick.

This is not to sneer at the positive changes in China. Hundreds of millions of people have experienced big increases in living standards. Better to have $6,710 of per capita GDP than $3,710. But China still has a long way to go if the goal is a vibrant and rich free-market economy. The country's nominal communist leadership has allowed economic liberalization, but China is still an economically repressed nation. Economic Freedom of the World ranks China 82 out of 141, just one spot above Russia, and the Index of Economic Freedom has an even lower score, 140 out of 179 nations.

Hopefully, China will continue to move in the right direction. As Jonah Goldberg notes in his Townhall column, it is good for America to have China become a more prosperous nation.

Yes, technically, China's gross domestic product is now slightly ahead of Japan's. But GDP is a gross statistic. It doesn't tell you nearly as much as you might think. In a very real way, China is still poorer than Japan. It's also poorer than Tunisia, Ecuador, Gabon, Kazakhstan and Namibia. ...China still has enormous problems, many of which aren't reflected in its GDP growth rates, and without democracy, a free press and the rule of law, we can't know what all of the problems are until they explode (and neither can the Chinese). But all of this misses the most important point. Economic "competitiveness" is a con. It assumes that when other countries prosper, America loses. That's nonsense. If the average Chinese worker were as rich as the average Japanese worker, it would be an economic windfall for the United States. Conversely, if China's economy imploded tomorrow, we would "gain" competitively but suffer economically. The cult of competitiveness is just a ruse used to justify the ambitions of economic planners and the pundits who worship them.

When Keynesians Attack

If I was organized enough to send Christmas cards, I would take Richard Rahn off my list. I do one blog post to call attention to his Washington Times column and it seems like everybody in the world wants to jump down my throat. I already dismissed Paul Krugman's rant and responded to Ezra Klein's reasonable attack. Now it's time to address Derek Thompson's critique on the Atlantic's site.

At the risk of re-stating someone else's argument, Thompson's central theme seems to be that there are many factors that determine economic perfformance and that it is unwise to make bold pronouncements about policy A causing result B. If that's what Thompson is saying, I very much agree (and if it's not what he's trying to say, then I apologize, though I still agree with the sentiment). That's why I referred to Reagan decreasing the burden of government and Obama increasing the burden of government. I wanted to capture all the policy changes that were taking place, including taxation, spending, monetary policy, regulation, etc.Yes, the flagship policies (tax reduction for Reagan and so-called stimulus for Obama) were important, but other factors obviously are part of the equation.

The biggest caveat, however, is that one should always be reluctant to make sweeping claims about what caused the economy to do X or Y in a given year. Economists are terrible forecasters, but we're not even very proficient when it comes to hindsight analysis abourt short-run economic fluctuations. Indeed, the one part of my original post that causes me a bit of guilt is that I took the lazy route and inserted an image of the chart from Richard's column. Excerpting some of his analysis would have been a better approach, particularly since I much prefer to focus on the impact of policies on long-run growth and competitiveness (which is what I did in my New York Post column from earlier this week and also why I'm reluctant to embrace Art Laffer's warning of major economic problems in 2011).

But a blog post is no fun if you just indicate where you and a critic have common ground, so let me know identify four things about Thompson's post that rubbed me the wrong way.

1. To reinforce his warning about making excessive claims about different recessions/recoveries, Thompson pointed out that someone could claim that Reagan's recovery was associated with the 1982 TEFRA tax hike. I've actually run across people that think this is a legitimate argument, so it's worth taking a moment to explain why it isn't true. When analyzing the impact of tax policy changes, it's important to look at when tax changes were implemented, not when they were enacted (data on annual tax rates can be found here). Reagan's Economic Recovery Tax Act was enacted in 1981, but the lower tax rates weren't fully implemented until 1984. This makes it a bit of a challenge to pinpoint when the economy actually received a net tax cut. The tax burden may actually have increased in 1981 since the parts of the Reagan tax cuts that took effect that year were offset by the impact of bracket creep (the tax code was not indexed to protect against inflation until the mid-1980s). There was a bigger tax rate reduction in 1982, but there was still bracket creep, as well as previously-legislated payroll tax increases (enacted during the Carter years). TEFRA also was enacted in 1982, which largely focused on undoing some of the business tax relief in Reagan's 1981 plan. People have argued whether the repeal of promised tax relief is the same as a tax increase, but that's not terribly important for this analysis. What does matter is that the tax burden did not fall much (if at all) in Reagan's first year and might not have changed too much in 1982. In 1983, by contrast, it's fairly safe to say the next stage of tax rate reductions was substantially larger than any concomitant tax increases. That doesn't mean, of course, that one should attribute all changes in growth to what's happening to the tax code. But it does suggest that it is a bit misleading to talk about tax cuts in 1981 and tax increases in 1983. One final point. The main insight of supply-side economics is that changes in the overall tax burden are not as important as changes in the tax structure. As such, it's also important to look at which taxes were going up and which ones were decreasing. This is why Reagan's 1981 tax plan compares so favorably with Bush's 2001 tax plan (which was filled with tax credits and other policies that had little of no impact on incentives for productive behavior).

2. In addition to wondering whether one could argue that higher taxes triggered the Reagan boom, Thompson also speculates whether it might be possible to blame the tax cuts in Obama's stimulus for the economy's subsequent sub-par performance. There are two problems with that hypothesis. First, a substantial share of the tax cuts in the so-called stimulus were actually new spending being laundered through the tax code (see footnote 3 of this Joint Committee on Taxation publication). To the extent that the provisions represented real tax relief, they were much more akin to Bush's non-supply side 2001 tax cuts and a far cry from the marginal tax-rate reductions enacted in 1981 and 2003. And since even big tax cuts have little or no impact on the economy if incentives to engage in productive behavior are unaffected, there is no reason to blame (or credit) Obama's tax provisions for anything.

3. Why doesn't anyone care that the Federal Reserve almost always is responsible for serious recessions? This isn't a critique of Thompson's post since he doesn't address monetary policy from this angle, but if we go down the list of serious economic hiccups in recent history (1974-75, 1980-82, and 2008-09), bad monetary policy inevitably is a major cause. In short, the Fed periodically engages in easy-money policy. This causes malinvestment and/or inflation, and a recession seems to be an unavoidable consequence. Yet the Fed seems to dodge any serious blame. At some point, one hopes that policy makers (especially Fed Governors) will learn that easy money policies such as artificially low interest rates are not a smart approach.

4. Thompson writes, "Is Mitchell really saying that $140 billion on Medicaid, firefighters, teachers, and infrastructure projects are costing the economy five percentage points of economic growth?" No, I'm not saying that and didn't say that, but I have been saying for quite some time that taking money out of the economy's left pocket and putting it in the economy's right pockets doesn't magically increase prosperity. And to the extent money is borrowed from private capital markets and diverted to inefficient and counter-productive programs, the net impact on the economy is negative. Thompson also writes that, "Our unemployment picture is a little more complicated than 'Oh my god, Obama is killing jobs by taking over the states' Medicaid burden!'" Since I'm not aware of anybody who's made that argument, I'm not sure how to respond. That being said, jobs will be killed by having Washington take over state Medicaid budgets. Such a move would lead to a net increase in the burden of government spending, and that additional spending would divert resources from the productive sector of the economy.

The moral of the story, though, is to let Richard Rahn publicize his own work.

Responding to Paul Krugman and Ezra Klein

I seem to have touched a raw nerve with my post earlier today comparing Reagan and Obama on how well the economy performed coming out of recession. Both Ezra Klein and Paul Krugman have denounced my analysis (actually, they denounced me approving of Richard Rahn's analysis, but that's a trivial detail). Krugman responded by asserting that Reaganomics was irrelevant (I'm not kidding) to what happened in the 1980s. Klein's response was more substantive, so let's focus on his argument. He begins by stating that the recent recession and the downturn of the early 1980s were different creatures. My argument was about how strongly the economy rebounded, however, not the length, severity, causes, and characteristics of each recession. But Klein then cites Rogoff and Reinhardt to argue that recoveries from financial crises tend to be less impressive than recoveries from normal recessions.

That's certainly a fair argument. I haven't read the Rogoff-Reinhardt book, but their hypothesis seems reasonable, so let's accept it for purposes of this discussion. Should we therefore grade Obama on a curve? Perhaps, but it's also true that deep recessions usually are followed by more robust recoveries. And since the recent downturn was more severe than the the one in the early 1980s, shouldn't we be experiencing some additional growth to offset the tepidness associated with a financial crisis?

I doubt we'll ever know how to appropriately measure all of these factors, but I don't think that matters. I suspect Krugman and Klein are not particularly upset about Richard Rahn's comparisons of recessions and recoveries. The real argument is whether Reagan did the right thing by reducing the burden of government and whether Obama is doing the wrong thing by heading in the opposite direction and making America more like France or Greece. In other words, the fundamental issue is whether we should have big government or small government. I think the Obama Administration, by making government bigger, is repeating many of the mistakes of the Bush Administration. Krugman and Klein almost certainly disagree.

New Academic Study Shows Obamanomics Will Undermine Prosperity

These results won't come as a surprise to anyone who has compared long-run growth rates in Hong Kong, the United States, France, and North Korea, but there's a new study by three economists showing that nations with better tax policy grow faster and create more jobs. There are many other factors that also determine growth, as this video explains, but punishing investors and entrepreneurs with high tax rates is never a good idea. Here's a passage from the study's abstract, including a specific warning about the anti-growth impact of Obama's plan for higher taxes in 2011.

Results indicate that lower tax rates are associated with more favorable economic activity, including growth in GDP, lower unemployment, and higher savings. These findings suggest that at the micro-level, corporate managers should consider tax rates when deciding to locate or not locate business operations within a given country, especially if the goal is to locate where the economy is dynamic. At the macro-level, before making changes to tax law, policy makers should carefully consider how tax rates affect economic activity. For example, policy makers in the US Congress, at the time of this writing, are considering whether to allow the Bush tax cuts to expire in 2010. If the Congress allows that to happen, the outcome would effectively be the largest tax increase in US history.

Don't Trust Economists

Sometimes a picture really does tell a thousand words. Here's a chart, based on data from the Philadelphia Fed, showing actual economic results compared to the predictions of professional economists. As you can see, my profession does a wretched job. Comparisons based on predictions from the IMF, OECD, CBO, and OMB doubtlessly would generate equally embarrassing results. This does not mean economists are idiots (insert obvious joke here), but it is an additional reason why Keynesianism is misguided. If economists are unable to predict what's going to happen with the economy in the near future, why should we expect anything positive when politicians tinker with short-run economic performance? That's especially the case when they pass so-called stimulus legislation that increases the burden of government spending.

h/t: James Montier, via Paul Kedrosky, via Andrew Sullivan

France Wants to Move the Goal Posts to Hide Dismal Economic Performance

A column in the Wall Street Journal mocks President Sarkozy for suggesting that gross domestic product, which is how economic growth is measured, be changed to include subjective variables such as happiness. This is a transparent attempt to paper over France's sluggish economic performance. Happiness is important, of course, but it comes about by allowing people to make voluntary choices in a free society, not by creating involuntary leisure with stifling tax rates and welfare dependency:

French President Nicolas Sarkozy recently said he wanted the nations of the world to stop using GDP, or gross domestic product, as the main measure of their economic performance. He wants them instead to work up another metric that takes into account not only economic production but such things as environmental quality and even time not spent in traffic—a sort of gross national satisfaction index. France has excellent reason to suppress GDP statistics. Since 1982, among developed nations, France has been a clear laggard in GDP growth. In the quarter century following 1982, France's GDP growth rate was a mere 2.1% per year in comparison to the U.S.'s 3.3%. Thus the U.S. grew at more than a 50% premium to France per year during that span. When the quarter century elapsed, Americans were one-third richer than the French. ...countries of "old Europe" such as France and Italy that were content to stand pat with an overregulated private sector and tax rates well above 50% were left in the dust. In 2003, as the Iraq war got going, France complained that the U.S. was the world's "hyperpower." Yet France itself was partly responsible for this fate. ...If Mr. Sarkozy's statisticians ever come up with their new economic index, they should be sure it includes leisure time—because that is one thing the French economy excels at producing. In 2004, the year he won the Nobel Prize, economist Edward Prescott asked, in the title of a journal article, "Why Do Americans Work So Much More Than Europeans?" The answer, he found, was tax rates. Tax rates had fallen so much in the U.S. by that year that the American workforce couldn't wait to get on the job—or start a business—because you got to keep so much of what you earned. In contrast, high and progressive French taxes left over from the 1970s lured people away from work, especially as they started doing well. So people came to take seven-hour days and six-week vacations, as well as not show any particular interest in striking out on their own in a work-intensive small business. The oldest and most pathetic trick in the book when you lose a contest is to try to move the goal posts. GDP statistics of the past quarter century have shamed France but flattered the U.S., Britain and East Asia. Mr. Sarkozy's gambit to paper over this real difference will be lucky to find any takers.